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DIVORCE & TAXES: REV. RUL. 67-221
PHILIP MULLOCK*
A notable feature of the contemporary tax scene is a commendable
desire for improvements in the law. In some areas, however, the reformist
zeal seems wedded to an unconcern for, if not unawareness of, the obsta-
cles to be overcome. An example in point' is the current concern for the
divorced wife who receives a settlement (nobody, of course, is bothered
about the divorced wife who gets nothing), which is particularly note-
worthy in view of the Internal Revenue Commissioner's chivalrous action
in championing her cause. It is unlikely, of course, that divorced wives
will complain about this solicitude. But we should not therefore over-
look the general undesirability of the Commissioner taking it upon him-
self to exempt from tax one of the parties to a certain type of transaction
without any apparent authority other than his "say so." Since the Com-
missioner's ruling has been applauded by Professor Schwartz, at least so
far as common law jurisdictions are concerned,2 I shall use his arguments
as a basis for demonstrating the dubious nature of the ruling.
In United States v. Davis,' the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that a
transfer of property by a former husband to his former wife pursuant to
a pre-divorce settlement incorporated in the divorce decree was a realiza-
tion of gain to the husband in the amount by which the fair market value
of the property exceeded his basis; that the "property received" by the
husband was the release of the wife's inchoate marital rights; and that
the marital rights released should be deemed to be of the same value as
the property transferred. By way of dictum, the Court added that the
wife's basis for the property received would be its fair market value. The
Commissioner then generously announced in Rev. Rul. 67-221' that the
wife in the Davis situation realized no gain or loss.
The marital rights involved in Davis included (1) a right of intestate
succession, (2) a right upon divorce to a reasonable share of the husband's
property, and (3) a dower right in the hubsand's realty.' Rev. Rul 67-22 1,
on the other hand, mentions only dower. Since nothing of any significance
for present purposes turns on the substantive distinctions between dower
and (1) and (2) I shall speak only of dower or marital property rights,
treating the two expressions as synonyms.
If we assume that the divorced (or about-to-be-divorced) wife (here-
after W) can be a separate taxpayer and that the receipt of property of
* Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law.
1. Another is discussed in Mullock, The Constitutional Problem of Taxing Gifts as
Income, 53 MiNx. L. REV. 247 (1968).
2. Schwartz, Divorce and Taxes: New Aspects of the Davis Denouement, 15 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 176 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
3. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
4. 1967-2 Cum. BuLL. 63.
5. 370 U.S. 65, 70 (1962).
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itself is a realized gain,' then the relevant alternatives in the case of W
are as follows:
(i) she should not be taxed at all;
(ii) she should be taxed on the entire market value of the
property received;
(iii) she should be taxed on something less than the entire
market value.
If (i), the position of Rev. Rul. 67-221 and Professor Schwartz, is to be
accepted then it must be shown either
(a) that the receipt by W of property itself is not a realized
gain; or
(b) that the transaction is, for tax purposes, no more than a
non-taxable division of property; or
(c) that the value of what W received is merely a recoupment
of capital; or
(d) that W received a gift or the equivalent of an inheritance;
or
(e) though neither (a), (b), (c) nor (d) applied, that there
are policy reasons having nothing to do with (a), (b),
(c), or (d) which justify not levying a tax on W.
7
6. The doctrine of realization refers to what has been called the economic objectivity of
income [see Lowndes, Current Conceptions of Taxable Income, 25 OHro ST. L.J. 151 (1965)]
which denotes an event or transaction measurably changing the taxpayer's economic position
in a way that can be routinely handled by officials. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189
(1920) ; Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940) ; Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
Basically the doctrine is concerned with whether there is an adequate gain to sustain the tax
sought to be levied. This seems to be recognized by the Court in Davis when it states: "We
now turn to the threshold question of whether the transfer in issue was an appropriate occa-
sion for taxing the accretion to the stock. There can be no doubt that Congress . . . [in
section 61(a) INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, hereinafter referred to only by section] intended that
the economic growth of this stock be taxed." 370 U.S., at 68. The Court then continued:
"The problem confronting us is simply when is such accretion to be taxed. Should the eco-
nomic gain be presently assessed against [the husband] or should this assessment await a
subsequent transfer of the property by the wife?" 370 U.S., at 68. The word "when" usually
signifies a mere timing or tax accounting problem. What the Court means here, however,
is that it must decide whether the transaction should be treated
a) as the satisfaction by the husband, with appreciated property, of a legal claim of the
wife, which would result in the accretion being taxed to the husband now; or
b) as a gift to the wife which, by reason of section 1015, would result in the accretion be-
ing taxed if at all on a subsequent (taxable) disposition of the property by the wife; or
c) as some sort of non-taxable division of property.
A realized gain is taxable unless there are reasons having nothing to do with the prob-
lem of realization which justify not taxing the gain. See Mullock, Current Conceptions of
Taxable Income, 26 OHIo ST. L.J. 43 (1965).
7. Since the Supreme Court has told us that the word "incomes" in the Sixteenth Amend-
ment is used in its ordinary language sense, Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206-07 (1920),
and since Congress has stated that the word "income" in section 61(a) is used in the Six-
teenth Amendment sense, S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 168 (1953), one valid ground
for excluding a realized gain from section 61(a) would be that it did not come within the
ordinary language meaning of the word "income." But in view of the fact that the wife in
Davis could not be said to have received either a gift or an inheritance (see text at note 50
infra), there does not seem to be much of a case for arguing that what she received did not
come within the ordinary meaning of income. Regarding the ordinary language aspects of
income, see note 1, supra.
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Rev. Rul. 67-221 adopts (i) without giving any reasons therefor.
Professor Schwartz adopts (i) for reasons essentially falling under (b).
And though his reasons are put forward as fundamentals of the tax law,
it seems as though he also believes (e) to be the case, almost self-evi-
dently. His argument in favor of (i) (b), for common law jurisdictions,
is as follows:
1. Assume that the family's assets consist of the following, all
of which, under state law, are deemed to be the property of the




1,000 shares XYZ Corp 80,000 50,000
Other assets 90,000 20,000
Total $180,000 $80,000
It is agreed by the parties that, in satisfaction of the wife's
marital property rights, she will receive the $10,000 cash and
the XYZ stock, worth $80 per share and having a basis to the
husband of $50 per share.8
2. According to Revenue Ruling 67-221, the wife has neither
gain nor loss as a result of the division in the Davis type of
case, and she obtains a basis for the property received equal to
its fair market value as of the date of transfer. These conclu-
sions confirm what the Supreme Court in Davis assumed (with-
out deciding) would be the consequences to her. Moreover, on
close analysis, they are the inevitable results flowing from the
Court's decision in that case and the rationale underlying it.'
3. Some have suggested that, in terms of the facts [above]
assumed, the wife ought to have a taxable gain of $90,000 when
she relinquishes marital property with a zero (or at least no
provable) basis in return for $10,000 cash and property worth
$80,000. The fallacy of such a suggestion is apparent when
one bears in mind the context in which the alleged "gain" arises
-the mere division of the family's wealth-and reflects upon
certain fundamentals concerning the federal income tax.' °
4. In the first place, the marital property rights relinquished
are rights which are disregarded for income tax purposes-the
property to which they relate is treated as solely the property
of the husband. Hence, if any gain or loss is to be realized with
respect to that property at the time of the division, under fa-
miliar tax principles he (as the owner of the property)-not she
-should realize it. Moreover, to tax the wife upon her receipt
of a part of the property would have the anomalous effect of
8. Schwartz, note 2 supra, at 177.
9. Id. at 181.
lo. Id.
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subjecting to tax more than the total amount of gain to be taxed
with respect to the entire estate. For example, under the facts
which have been assumed, the total amount of gain which ought
ever to be taxed is $100,000 (the difference between the estate's
total value and the basis of the various assets). The husband,
according to Davis, realizes $30,000 of that $100,000 when he
transfers the XYZ stock to the wife. The remaining $70,000
will eventually be realized by him or by his gratuitous transferee
(unless basis is stepped-up at death under section 1014). Thus,
to tax the wife at all would be improper."
5. Finally, to contend that, unrelated to the accretion in the
value of the estate, the wife has $90,000 "income" is to neglect
taking cognizance of what the income tax is all about. In gen-
eral, it is a tax on the net increase in one's wealth as the result
of his or her commercial, profit-seeking ventures. Neither mar-
riage nor the division of the family's property is such. The mere
fact that, in terms of the "ownership" of the property, the wife
is "richer" by $90,000 after the division than before is no more
a taxable gain by her than is the same degree to which the hus-
band is "poorer" a deductible loss by him. The $90,000-worth
of changed ownership is a matter beyond the proper scope of
the income tax, which, traditionally, has been held inapplicable
to the economic benefits shifted to the wife by reason of the
dissolution of the marriage.'
2
The argument, it will be noted, purports to be a "close analysis"
based upon "certain fundamentals concerning the federal income tax law"
designed to show that Rev. Rul. 67-221 is "the inevitable result of the
Court's decision in Davis and the rationale underlying it.""
If Professor Schwartz's first point that "the marital property rights
relinquished ... are disregarded for income tax purposes' ' 4 is intended as
a general proposition of the tax law, it is just not true. Consider, e.g.,
Farid-el-Sultanel v. Commissioner5 (which one commentator has stated
was cited with approval in Davis.) 6 There the issue was W's basis for
11. Id.
12. Id. at 182.
13. Note 9 supra and accompanying text.
14. Note 11 supra and accompanying text. As authority Prof. Schwartz cites a passage
in Davis wherein the Court points out that the wife's marital property rights were merely
an encumbrance on the husband's property, and that while the satisfaction of her claim "may
ultimately result in the ownership of some of the husband's property . . . this happenstance
does not equate the transaction with a division of property by co-owners." 370 U.S. at 70-71.
He also cites sections 2034 and 2043(b) of the estate tax statute. Just how these citations
support the proposition that "the marital property rights [of W] . . . are disregarded for
income tax purposes" is not dear. And as pointed out in the text accompanying this note,
the fact that the property which W's rights encumber is treated solely as the property of
the husband (because he owns it) is hardly a good reason for arguing that therefore W's
rights are disregarded for income tax purposes.
15. 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947).
16. See H. RUDICK, TAx CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE AND ITS TERMINATION 22, 142-43
(1967) [hereinafter cited as RUDicx].
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computing gain on the sale of property acquired under an ante-nuptial
contract, and was seen to turn on whether W took the property as donee
or purchaser. Although the question of whether W had an income tax
basis for the claim rights used to "purchase" the property did not arise,
it can hardly be said that her rights were "disregarded." What Professor
Schwartz may mean is that any disposition of family property owned
entirely by the husband can produce tax consequences for him only, and
-in a footnote Professor Schwartz adds that this clearly would be the case
if during marriage the property were sold and the husband and wife filed
separate returns.1
7
Now it is, of course, true that W's dower rights (which is what Rev.
Rul. 67-221 deals with) are parasitic upon the husband's real estate. But
the fact that only the husband is or should be taxed upon a disposition
of his underlying real estate is quite irrelevant to the question dealt with
in Rev. Rul. 67-221, i.e., what are (not "ought to be") the income tax
consequences to W when she releases her dower rights in that property.
That a claim-any claim-against the husband's estate must of necessity
be satisfied out of that estate in no way requires that the claimant cannot
for income tax purposes realize gain or loss on the satisfaction of the
claim. Nothing in the income tax law is designed to put pre and post
divorce arms-length dealings between spouses and former spouses in a
privileged position, though this is not to say that they should not be so
treated. In fact, when dealings between spouses are singled out for special
attention under the tax law, it is because their arms-length credentials
are suspect; 8 but in Davis the Court emphasized that the parties had
dealt at arms-length.' 9 Professor Schwartz's first "fundamental" clearly
offers no good income tax law reason why only the husband should realize
a gain (or loss) when a claim of W against the husband is settled in an
arms-length transaction. Moreover, the fact that W in the Davis situation
is deemed to take the property as purchaser is inconsistent with labeling
the transaction as a mere division of family property. And even though
W does take the property as purchaser, ° this does not require that she
should be treated as a purchaser for cash, i.e., the detriment to W (relin-
quishment of a claim with no or a zero basis) should not be treated as
equivalent to a cash payment to the husband. No doubt, so far as the
tax consequences to the husband are concerned, we can say it is as if he
had sold the property and paid the proceeds over to W, but surely not as
if he had sold the property to W for cash.
On the facts of our hypothet, however, it would be both anomalous
and improper, argues Professor Schwartz, to tax W on anything.2' This
is merely an inference Professor Schwartz draws from his point that since
17. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 181 n.32.
18. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 267, 1239.
19. See 370 U.S. at 72.
20. See RunlCK, supra note 16.
21. See point 4 of Prof. Schwartz's argument, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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the husband owns all the property only he should be taxed on the gain
realized on its disposition. Since an inference is false if its premise is true
and its conclusion false, if we can falsify Professor Schwartz's conclusion
while granting his premise, we shall have falsified his inference.
As long as the marriage continues it is true that any gain realized on
a disposition of the family property will be realized (in our hypothet) by
the husband, regardless of whether joint or separate returns are filed. Di-
vorce will not change this; any gain realized on a disposition of the family
property will still be realized by the husband. But once the parties are
divorced it is no longer true that there is just one (family) estate totaling
$180,000 in value, because there is now an ex-husband with an estate of
$90,000 net and an ex-wife with an estate of $90,000. The fact that W's
$90,000 is still parasitic on the husband's $180,000 of assets is no longer
a relevant factor, for she now has a full-fledged legal claim based on the
settlement which is worth $90,000; if she dies before the settlement is
effected, her estate will surely include as an asset the claim against the
husband's estate. It is true that any gain realized on a taxable disposition
of property owned by the husband will be taxed to the husband. But, as
a matter of tax law, it is false that it would be improper to also tax W
when that disposition satisfies a legal claim of W against the husband
2
simply because the husband is taxed.
The second fundamental offered by Professor Schwartz goes to "what
the income tax is all about."28 "In general, he says, "it is a tax on the
net increase in one's wealth as the result of his or her commercial, profit-
seeking ventures."24 Although this will, of course, pass as a broad and
rough generalization, it is singularly inapt in what is put forward as a
"close analysis."2 Yet it is used by Professor Schwartz as the major
premise in support of a conclusion that the (divorce-induced) division of
the family's property is not a taxable event, the minor premise of the
argument being that the division of the family's property is not a com-
mercial, profit-seeking venture. Here the argument obviously is vitiated
by the falsity (through over-generalization) of its major premise; though
a commercial, profit-seeking venture is often sufficient, it is not a neces-
sary condition for taxability. Moreover, if the divorce-induced division of
the family's property is not to be a taxable event, it is difficult to see why
only the wife should benefit from such a rule. Yet it is nowhere suggested
by Professor Schwartz that the husband should not be taxed in the Davis
situation; rather, he believes that when the husband owns all the family
22. Indeed, if W released her marital rights in consideration for the husband's funded
promise to transfer property to W in the future, a case could be made for taxing W before
the property was transferred to her. And if the husband then died one second before the
agreed time of transfer, the appreciation in value of the property transferred would not be
taxed to him at all.
23. Note 12 supra and accompanying text.
24. Id.
25. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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property, taxability of the husband requires non-taxability of the wife,
and probably the converse as well.
Professor Schwartz's position, then, is that W should not be taxed
because the transaction is a mere (divorce-induced) division of family
property, and he states (above) that Rev. Rul. 67-221 "confirm[s] what
the Supreme Court assumed (without deciding) would be the tax conse-
quences to [W].*26 But the Court does state, in a footnote on the page
referred to by Professor Schwartz, that "[u]nder present administrative
practice, the release of marital rights in exchange for property ... is not
considered a taxable event [so far as W is concerned] .,121 This statement
is presumably made, in view of the references there given,28 because of the
problem of determining an income tax basis for the claim released by W.
It cannot be said, however, that the Court assumed that W should not be
taxed because the transaction was a mere division of family property. In
fact, the Court stated that while it would not be "completely illogical to
consider the shearing off of the wife's rights in her husband's property as
a division of that property ... we believe the contrary to be the case. 29
As the footnote indicates, it is W's basis problem that is regarded by the
Court as the justification for not taxing her,8" a fact which brings us to
(i) (c) (W not taxed as she receives merely a recoupment of capital) and
(ii) (W taxed on the entire market value).
Professor Schwartz seems to concede that W has either no or a zero
basis for her marital property rights. 1 Furthermore, in the introduction
to his paper he observes that "[i]n the context of divisions of property
upon divorce or separation, the central issue ... whether gain or loss has
been 'realized' "within the meaning of section 1001(a) was resolved, in
Davis, in the affirmative, 'the amount realized' by the husband for pur-
poses of section 1001 (a) in common law jurisdictions being the fair mar-
ket value of the property he transferred."" From the cases cited by the
Court" and its rejection of the division of property theory in favor of
regarding the transaction as the settlement by a debtor of an obligation or
claim, it is reasonable to assume that for income tax purposes it is as if
the husband in Davis had sold the property for its fair market value and
then transferred the proceeds to the wife,8 4 which, as already observed, is
to say neither that he sold the property to the wife nor that she trans-
26. Id.
27. 370 U.S. at 73 n.7.
28. The court cites Taylor & Schwartz, Tax Aspects of Marital Property Agreements,
7 TAx L. REv. 19, 30 (1951); Comment, The Lump Sum Divorce Settlement as a Taxable
Exchange, 8 U.C.LA. L. REV. 593, 601-02 (1961).
29. 370 U.S. at 70.
30. See note 28 supra.
31. Note 10 supra and accompanying text.
32. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 176.
33. United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960); International
Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943), cited in 370 U.S. 65 at 72;
Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (1954).
34. Cf., Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940).
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ferred to the husband property having a basis equal to the fair market
value of what she received. Rather than spell out this "as if" construction
of the facts, the Court preferred, unfortunately, to start from the mean-
ingless proposition that "the 'property received' [by the husband] was
the release of the wife's inchoate marital rights."" 5 An uncritical accep-
tance of this "proposition" leads quite naturally to the misconception that
an exchange of two properties took place, the value of what W received
then being assumed to equal the value of what she transferred, suggest-
ing that no more was involved than the conversion of one asset into
another of equal value producing no change in her net worth and thus
no taxable consequences. From a simple economic standpoint this has an
obvious appeal, particularly if we can label W a purchaser.3 6 And if we
liken her to a purchaser for cash then, of course, she would realize neither
gain nor loss by virtue of the purchase. But, as we have noted, she did not
purchase for cash, the consideration for the husband's transfer being the
relinquishment by W of her claim against the husband. To say that the
husband transferred property to W in consideration for the release of her
marital rights is not to say that he transferred the property to W in ex-
change for the release of her marital rights. We know the value of the
claim she relinquished; what we want to know is whether it had an in-
come tax basis.
There is in the tax law a well-known distinction between "income"
and "capital" which is fairly intelligible, and the tax concept of "basis"
can readily (for present purposes) be identified with invested cost capital.
Rev. Rul. 67-221" involves a problem similar to that which faced the
courts in the Farmers' & Merchants' Bank 8 and Raytheon 9 cases deal-
ing with damages received as compensation for the destruction of busi-
ness goodwill having no income tax basis. The former case held the
damages not to be taxable but the latter held them to be taxable. Though
goodwill may be a most valuable "asset" as the "premium value" attach-
ing to the assets of a business, it does not represent, though it may in-
directly reflect, an investment of cost capital in the ordinary sense. There-
fore, it will have no income tax basis (invested cost capital). Underlying
the income tax treatment of damages for tortious injury to property-
even goodwill in the sense described (hereafter "premium value" or
"created" goodwill) seems to be regarded as property for this purpose
-is the principle that to the extent of the basis of what is lost due to the
injury the receipt of damages constitutes no more than the recoupment of
invested capital (tax basis), which is not considered to come within the
meaning of either the word "income" as used in section 61 (a) or the word
35. 370 U.S. at 72.
36. 370 U.S. at 69 n.6; RVDICK, supra note 16.
37. 1967-2 Cum. BuLL. 63.
38. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1932).
39. Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944). The discussion in the text is based on Mullock, Basis and
"Created" Goodwill, 47 TAXES 164 (1969).
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"incomes" as used in the Sixteenth Amendment." In most cases dealing
with injury to property other than created goodwill, "capital" and income
tax basis coincide with invested cost.41 Hence the relevant choice facing
the courts in the Famers' & Merchants' Bank and Raytheon cases was
whether to extend the notion of capital as employed in the recoupment
of capital doctrine to cover created goodwill or to limit it to invested cost
capital.
In support of the first alternative a court could, with some plausi-
bility, point to the rule excluding damages for personal injury from gross
income, which, in view of the emphasis on the compensatory aspect, can
be justified taxwise only by a metaphorical extension of the recoupment
of capital doctrine. Since its application is most obvious and natural in
the business area it could be argued that it requires far less strain on the
doctrine to extend it to business goodwill of the "premium value" kind.
However, no such argument was offered in the Farmers' & Merchants'
Bank case, the court in effect being content with the mere unsupported
assertion that damages for tortious injury to created goodwill were not
taxable. In the Raytheon case, on the other hand, the damages were held
taxable because no basis had been proved for the goodwill destroyed.
Farmers' was distinguished on the ground that there the goodwill was
only partially destroyed, whereas in Raytheon it was totally destroyed. 2
But if damages for injury to created goodwill are to be taxed, it should
not be because of failure to prove a basis therefor but rather because such
goodwill cannot have a basis. If this had been clearly perceived, the court
could have rejected the tort compensatory damages theory of Farmers'
and taken the position that the recoupment of capital doctrine should be
limited to "invested cost" capital (income tax basis) thus giving a rational
basis for its decision that the entire damages received were taxable. There
is no good reason for extending the recoupment of capital doctrine to
created goodwill.
No doubt the justification for the metaphorical extension of the re-
coupment of capital doctrine to damages for personal injury is to be found
in a humanitarian policy not to add further to the burdens of those al-
ready injured. But this is not to say there is no realization of gain. In-
deed, the receipt of damages for personal injury is an obvious realized
gain. So if we do not tax those damages (and we do not) it must be
because policy reasons having nothing to do with the problem of realiza-
tion, justify the metaphorical extension of the recoupment of capital doc-
trine.48 Similarly, although it may be argued that in Davis the wife's
economic position did not change, the fact remains that whatever "capi-
40. Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921); Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 205 (1920); Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
41. Subject, of course, to depreciation or other cost recovery.
42. 144 F.2d 110, 114.
43. See generally Mullock, Current Conceptions of Taxable Income-A Comment, 26
01M ST. L.J. 43 (1965).
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tal" she may have had invested in what she gave up hardly constituted
an income tax basis as that concept is used in section 1001 (a) and sec-
tion 1012. To justify Rev. Rul. 67-2214" we have to say first, that in this
situation the notion of capital as used in the recoupment of capital doc-
trine should be extended beyond just "invested cost" capital, and sec-
ondly, that this extension is to be justified by policy considerations hav-
ing nothing to do with the problem of realization of gain and which take
precedence over the basis technicalities of section 1001 (a) and section
1012. The problem then becomes one of finding policy reasons strong
enough to outweigh the fact that the wife realized a gain when a claim
for which she had no income tax basis was satisfied.
It has been said45 that in Davis the Supreme Court cited Farid-el-
Sultaneh46 with approval; and, so far as one can tell, the bride-to-be in
that case was not taxed when she received property in consideration for
relinquishing her prospective marital rights. 47 There are far fewer grounds,
if any at all, for arguing that a bride-to-be has a basis for prospective
marital rights relinquished than there are when the relinquishment occurs
after marriage. In the latter case such grounds usually are reduced to the
proposition that in performing services during the marriage the wife is
building up a basis in her marital rights equal to the value of those ser-
vices, a rationalization finding little support in the history and develop-
ment of such notions as dower and curtesy.4 s But even if one is inclined
to accept it, there is the further problem that if services performed are to
build up a basis for the marital rights thereby acquired in an amount
equal to the value of those services, the value of the rights acquired
should be taxable to the wife; and of course they are not. Unless this
fundamental feature of the tax law is changed and since there is no in-
vestment of capital in the conventional sense and the analogy with dam-
ages for personal injury in tenuous, we must conclude that the wife cannot
have an income tax basis for her marital rights.
The writer has examined in detail Professor Schwartz's subdivisions
headed (i) (b) (W not taxed as the transaction amounts to a non-taxable
division of property), (i) (c) (W not taxed as she received merely a re-
coupment of capital), and (ii) (W taxed on entire market value) ;49 and
since (i) (c) and (ii) dispose of (iii) (W taxed on less than entire market
value) and (i) (a) (W not taxed as she realized no gain) obviously can-
not be accepted, there remain for consideration (i) (d) (W not taxed for
she received a gift) and (e) (W not taxed for policy reasons). So far as
(i) (d) is concerned, it suffices to note that
44. 1967-2 Cu-m. BuLL. 63.
45. RUDICK, supra note 16.
46. Faridh-el-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947).
47. Note that there is no exclusion when the wife receives alimony in the form of an
annuity.
48. 370 U.S. 65, 69 n.6.
49. Note 7 supra and accompanying text.
19691
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
1. the Court in Davis stated "[a] ny suggestion that the trans-
action . . . was a gift is completely unrealistic"; 5" and
2. rather than an inheritance, the wife's dower has always been
regarded as an encumbrance on the husband's estate.
Remaining for consideration is (i) (e), the question of non-tax con-
siderations, which could justify not taxing W on what she receives for the
relinquishment of her marital property rights. In the case of damages for
personal injury we surmount the basis difficulty and so justify the ex-
clusion by involving humanitarian policy considerations which, pace
Schwartz, are by no means obviously applicable in the Davis situation.
Professor Schwartz's position seems to be that divorce or separation are
(almost self-evidently) inappropriate occasions for the imposition of an
additional burden on W in the form of an income tax, though it is per-
fectly all right to tax the husband; that the division of the family's
property on divorce should not be treated as a taxable event so far as W
is concerned. But this, of course, is no more than a judgment reflecting
non-tax values, and is just another way of saying we ought not to tax W.5'
Such an evaluative use of ought, however, means that there are good rea-
sons for not taxing W. What we still require is an account of those reasons
and the evidence that supports them; until this is forthcoming, Rev.
Rul. 67-221 has little to commend it.5" If acceptable reasons can be put
forward they should be addressed to Congress rather than the Commis-
sioner; if a realized gain is not to be taxed, Congress, rather than the
Commissioner, should say so.
50. 370 U.S. at 65 n.6.
51. On the distinction between evaluative and prescriptive uses of the word "ought,"
see P. TAYLOR, NoRmaaanv DIscOURSE (1961).
52. The A.B.A. Section of Taxation, Committee on Domestic Relations Tax Problems,
recommends that no gain or loss be recognized by husband or wife in the Davis situation
and that the husband's basis carry over to the wife. However, the "arguments in favor of
the proposition" amount to little more than a catalogue of unsupported assertions. See 19
A.B.A. SEcTioN oF TAXATION BuLL. 62-68 (July, 1966).
